Family Secrets: Filial Support and its Impact on California Law

By Diana P. Zitser and Brandon Johnson

WHILE "HONOR THY father and thy mother" is a central tenant in many faiths and societies, very few people know that, in California, filial piety can be enforced under the law.[1]

Most people in California already know that California law can require a person to pay child support for the benefit of their minor children[2] and spousal support, also known as alimony, to their former spouse.[3] But the laws that can require an adult to pay filial support to their parents are so obscure that many legal practitioners are not aware they even exist.[4]

Filial Support and Adult Child Support[5]

While it is more widely known than the existence of filial support, many people do not know that California also has laws that can require a parent to support a child even after they reach adulthood if the child is incapacitated from earning a living and is without sufficient means.[6]

Neither the laws requiring filial support nor the laws requiring adult child support existed in the common law,[7] but both were codified in California's Civil Code when it was enacted in 1872.[8] They originally came from the same statute, former Civil Code §206.[9]

Former Civil Code §206 stated: "It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. The promise of an adult child to pay for necessaries previously furnished to such parent is binding."[10]

California's filial support and adult child support laws remained closely intertwined until 1994 when they were separated into two different statutes (Family Code §4400 and §3910, respectively). Therefore, a discussion of California's laws regarding filial support also involves a discussion of California's laws regarding adult child support.[11]

For example, in *Paxton v. Paxton*, an adult child support case, the California Supreme Court held that, because former Civil Code §206 did not set forth specific procedures for its enforcement, suits brought under former Civil Code §206 are actions in equity.[12] This holding has impacted the law of filial support even though it sprang from an adult child support case.[13]

Contrary to what many people would assume, the primary policy behind the laws of filial support and adult child support that were created by former Civil Code §206 was not and is not for the benefit of the people



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who receive the support.[14] Instead, "the main purpose of the statutes seems to be to protect the public from the burden of supporting poor people who have children [or parents] able to support them."[15] This policy is frequently cited in the case law for filial and adult child support, and it forms the basis for many of the aspects of the law relating to these types of support.

Duffy v. Yordi

One of the first opinions involving filial support is *Duffy v. Yordi*, which was decided in 1906.[16] In *Duffy*, a 77-year-old mother who was unable to support herself sued her adult daughter for filial support.[17] The mother had three other adult children—two other daughters who were already supporting her and a son who had not been heard from in several years.[18] The trial court ordered the daughter to pay one-third of the mother's needs.[19]

The California Supreme Court reversed the trial court, ruling that since the mother was already receiving support from her other adult daughters, there was no indication that the mother had need for additional support from the defendant, so she could not sue under former Civil Code §206.[20] The court seemed less concerned with balancing the equities of having all siblings share the burden of assisting mom than only making sure that the mother would not become a burden on the public. Duffy was distinguished by the 1962 appellate court decision in *Britton v. Steinberg*, but is otherwise remains the law regarding filial support.[21]

In *Britton*, an 86-year-old mother's adult daughter, acting as her mother's guardian, sued the mother's two other adult children, both sons, for filial support.[22] During the hearing, the daughter testified that, while she had previously been the mother's sole source of support, their mother now required extensive care that was beyond daughter's ability to provide and the mother needed to be placed in a "home for elderly persons."[23] The evidence confirmed that the daughter could not afford to pay for the cost of the home.[24]

After the trial court ordered support from at least one of the sons, that son appealed.[25] Relying exclusively on *Duffy*, the son argued that because their mother was already being supported by the daughter, she could not sue him for filial support.[26] The appellate court rejected this argument, holding that unlike in *Duffy*, there was a danger that the mother could become a public burden because she needed to be placed in a home and the daughter could not afford it.[27]

The son also tried to argue that there was no assurance that the mother would ever actually be placed in a home, but the appellate court also rejected that argument because requiring the mother to actually be placed in a home that the daughter could not afford before an order for filial support could be made would require the mother to become a public burden, which is exactly what the statute was enacted to prevent.[28]

Perhaps the most extreme example of the surprising effects that filial support can have is illustrated by a 1984 case, *Radich v. Kruly*.[29] In *Radich*, a father sued his adult daughter for filial support.[30] The daughter opposed the suit by showing, among other things, that her father had physically abused her. The trial court found that the physical abuse had occurred.[31]

Under California laws regarding spousal support, evidence of abuse perpetrated by a spouse must be considered by a court before support can be ordered.[32] And if one spouse is convicted of abusing the other, there may be either a rebuttable presumption disfavoring an award of spousal support to the abusive spouse, or, if the abusive spouse is convicted of a violent sexual felony or attempted murder, an award of spousal support to the abusive spouse may be entirely prohibited.[33]

In *Radich*, the trial court concluded that the father's physical abuse of his daughter had no bearing on the father's

suit for filial support and ordered the daughter to pay the support.[34] The daughter appealed, arguing that since suits for filial support under former Civil Code §206 are actions in equity, the doctrine of unclean hands should apply and her father should be precluded from bringing the suit because of his wrongful conduct.[35] The appellate court agreed that the father had unclean hands, but refused to allow the doctrine to be used as a complete defense to a claim for filial support.[36]

In making this holding, the appellate court referenced the policy behind former Civil Code §206 and ruled that the state's interest in relieving the public from the burden of supporting a parent who can be supported by their adult children gave it the ability to do so.[37] The appellate court then held that, even when a parent has abused their child, the child can be obligated to pay a sum which will take care of the parent's minimum needs.[38] In this way, the policy behind the filial support statute and a holding from a case about adult child support combined to create a disturbing law—a victim of child abuse can be ordered to support their abuser.

Balancing Equities in Filial Support

Despite the disturbing *Radich* holding, law relating to filial support has not been completely blind to the equities between payor and payee.[39] In 1955, California enacted former Civil Code §206.5, which, by at least 1957, excused a child—abandoned by a parent for a period of two or more years before they turned 16—from paying filial support.[40] But this absolution had its own exception, so that it did not apply when a parent was unable to support his or her children during periods of abandonment.[41]

Both the defense of abandonment and its exception for a parent who was unable to support a minor during a period of abandonment has survived the change in California's statutory scheme. It remains part of California's current laws regarding filial support, with the relevant minor age increased to eighteen.[42]

Another potential defense to a suit for filial support is discussed in *Parshall v. Parshall*, which was decided in 1922.[43] In *Parshall*, a man filed a suit for filial support against a woman who he claimed to be his adopted daughter.[44] The evidence showed that the woman had lived with, been raised by, and "been generously provided for" by the man and his wife since the woman was about four or five months old. She also shared his name and had been held out to the public as his child.[45] However, because she was neither the man's biological child nor had he legally adopted her, the trial court found that the man was not entitled to any filial support from the woman.[46]

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The man appealed and the appellate court noted that outside of California, several other states which had filial support laws had held that the class of "children" who owe an obligation of filial support are limited to biological offspring only, and do not include grandchildren, sons-in-law, stepchildren, or even adopted children.[47]

If the appellate court in *Parshall* had adopted this standard, it would have been a very significant departure from the primary policy behind the law of filial support that is relied on so often in other opinions. Instead, the appellate court noted that while the man may have stood *in loco parentis* to the woman, he was not her legal father, had refused to sign adoption documents in the past, and thus had no legal basis to make a claim for support.[48]

While *Radich* may provide the most extreme example of the apparent unfairness that can be created by the legal history of California's filial support law, it also seems to provide the most significant attempt in the law to balance the equities between payor and payee.[49] In *Radich*, in addition to the father's physical abuse, the daughter alleged—and the trial court found—that her father had caused her mental distress, often forced her to work in the fields during her minority, and delayed her entry into school. He also neglected to support her during her minority while he had the ability to do so and "falsely circulated that she was unchaste at the time of her marriage."[50]

While none of this was enough to convince the trial or appellate courts to completely absolve her of the duty to pay support, the appellate court did remand the case back to the trial court with instructions to reduce its award to the minimum required to prevent her father from becoming a burden on the public.[51]

As the appellate court stated: "Love, respect, loyalty, devotion and the natural and inevitable desire of a child to recompense a parent for the love, service, support and sacrifice usually lavished by a parent upon a child, cannot be legislated nor should the law force a child to make recompense for an assumed standard of upbringing, when a trial court finds on credible evidence that it never existed."[52]

Similar issues to those discussed in *Parshall* and *Radich* were again discussed in *Gluckman v. Gaines*, which was decided in 1968, four years after *Radich*.[53] In *Gluckman*, an alleged father sought filial support from an alleged son. In opposition, the alleged son raised the defense questioning

whether the man was the biological father. He also raised a defense of abusive parenting, including evidence that this alleged father refused to allow him to be bar mitzvahed.[54] The trial court made a finding that the man was the biological father, was in need of filial support, and ordered it to be provided.[55] The appellate court questioned whether either of these findings was supported by substantial evidence.[56]

The appellate court avoided reaching a decision on either of those issues.[57] Instead, the appellate court held that the alleged son should not be required to pay filial support because there was substantial evidence for the trial court's finding that he was unable to afford it.[58] The appellate court based this holding in the policy behind the statute, stating that, in its analysis, there was a greater danger that the young man would become a public charge if he was ordered to pay support than there was a danger that the alleged father would be a public charge without it.[59]

While it may not have been necessary to its decision, the appellate court also discussed the "assumed standard of upbringing" from *Radich* and stated that, based on how poorly the alleged father had treated the alleged son, the older man had very little reason to expect "filial devotion."[60]

In 1994, the California legislature repealed former Civil Code §206 and reenacted its filial support laws as part of the Family Code under Family Code §4400 *et seq*.[61] Both before and after this reenactment, California's filial support laws have also allowed public and private entities to seek reimbursement from adult children for aid or services that have been provided to parents in need of support.[62] But it does not appear that any opinions have been published in California in which an alleged parent has sought filial support from their adult child since *Gluckman*.

This means that the scope of the standard for measuring the extent to which a parent is entitled to filial support from their adult child that was set forth in *Radich* remains largely untested. Yet that standard seems to be supported by current filial support statutes, which give the courts discretion to order filial support after considering earning capacity and needs, obligations and assets, age and health, standard of living, and "other factors the court deems just and equitable."[63]

From the opinions in *Radich* and *Gluckman*, it appears that the "other factors the court deems just and equitable" can include any real or perceived grievance that the adult child may harbor against the parent seeking filial support, including such grievances as refusing to allow a son to be bar mitzvahed[64] or "falsely circulat[ing] that [a daughter] was unchaste at the time of her marriage."[65]

It is not hard to see how this could have far-ranging consequences for the future of filial support in California. If a parent does decide to file a request for support from their adult child, they should expect to be faced with a barrage of counter-arguments maligning their parenting skills and picking apart every aspect of their relationship with their child over the course of the child's entire life. Attorneys interacting with parents may want to advise their clients to keep a record of their children's childhood, not just for family memories, posterity, or custody disputes, but also as evidence to support a claim for parental support.

Impact of Filial Support on Other Law

Since their enactment in 1872, California's filial support laws have been made with consideration as to how they will impact those who are neither parents in need of support nor their children—as has already been discussed, the primary policy behind the filial support laws is to protect everyone else from the burden of supporting parents who cannot support themselves. But they have also had

effect on how other areas of the law have developed.

Perhaps the most significant way in which California's filial support laws have affected others is through the law relating to wrongful death actions. In *Evans v. Shanklin*, which was decided in 1936, a poor mother who was unable to support herself sought damages for the wrongful death of her adult son who had lived with her, but the then-existing law regarding standing to sue for wrongful death prohibited her from suing for wrongful death because she was not his heir.[66]

In its opinion, the appellate court lamented: "Though we might feel that considerations of social security and social justice should dictate that a mother situated as was the plaintiff mother here, living with and dependent upon her son for support and maintenance... coupled with his legal obligation during his lifetime under the provisions of [former] §206 of the Civil Code to maintain his mother, should have a right to bring an action for damages occasioned by the wrongful death of her son; nevertheless, the decision of the legislature as to how far it will extend the right is conclusive... The remedy for extending the right of action to the mother under the facts and circumstances of this case must come from the legislature."[67]

Legislation was then enacted to include dependent parents within the class of persons who can sue for wrongful death, to remedy the type of situation the court found in *Evans*.[68] In *Perry v. Medina*, a mother who was being financially assisted by her son, relied on that legislation to sue the drivers of a vehicle in which her son had been a passenger when it collided with a tractor-trailer rig, which resulted in her son's death.[69]

On appeal, the appellate court referred to the history of the statute that allowed dependent parents to sue for the wrongful death of their adult child that is described above, quoting *Evans*.[70] The appellate court in *Perry* quoted the filial support statute contained in former Civil Code §206, and stated that "[i]t is public policy that family take care of family when possible."[71] The court reversed the judgment, holding that there was a factual question regarding whether the mother was dependent on her son.[72]

Additionally, California's filial support laws nearly became a part of the state's criminal elder abuse laws. *People v. Heitzman* was decided in 1994, shortly after the current statutory scheme for California's filial support laws was enacted.[73] In *Heitzman*, the courts were asked to decide whether and to what extent the first portion of California Penal Code §368 was constitutional.[74] At the time, that portion of Penal Code §368 stated that it was a crime for any person to, "under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully cause or permit any elder or dependent adult to suffer."[75]

In *Heitzman*, a partially paralyzed 67-year-old man who had depended on his children for his daily care, died of neglect.[76] His sons, who had lived with him and been his caretakers at the time of his death, were prosecuted under a different part of the elder abuse statute.[77] But one of his daughters, who had previously been his primary caretaker but had stopped caring for him when she moved out a year before his death, was charged with permitting him to suffer under the portion of the statute described above.[78] She allegedly continued to regularly visit the home and, even though aware of his deplorable living conditions, did nothing except suggest to her brothers that they should take their father to a doctor.[79]

Before the trial, the daughter argued that the portion of Penal Code §368 under which she had been charged was unconstitutionally vague because it attempted to criminalize the actions of any person who permitted an elder to suffer without adequately defining who could be capable of permitting such abuse.[80] The case against her was dismissed and the prosecutor appealed.[81]

The appellate court first held that a person charged with violating the first portion of Penal Code §368 could only be criminally liable if they had a legal duty to act.[82] The appellate court then held that, due to the special relationship between a parent and their child, the defendant in this case did have a legal duty to act, and reversed the trial court's dismissal of the case.[83]

In making this holding, the appellate court relied on California's filial support laws, as well as Penal Code §270c,[84] which also makes it a misdemeanor for an adult child to fail to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance for an indigent parent if they are able to do so.[85] If the appellate court's holding had been left to stand, California's filial support laws would have become a part of its elder abuse laws. But the California Supreme Court ultimately rejected this standard and instead

based its holding on agency liability from California's tort law.[86]

Impact of Filial Support on Divorce Law

California's filial support laws have been a part of its Family Code since 1994, shortly after the Code was first enacted in 1992, but many people are still not aware of them or the impact that they can have in a divorce.[87]

In a California divorce case, there are several issues that a family law court may need to address. First, if the parties have minor children, the court will have to determine the custody of the children and issue orders regarding child support.[88] While it is not widely known, as is described above, the court can also order the parties to pay support for an adult child who is unable to support themselves.[89] Unlike filial support, a court can order a parent to pay adult child support even when the adult child is already being fully supported by another parent.[90]

As with support for a minor child, the amount of adult child support a parent can be ordered to pay is normally determined by a guideline formula enacted by California's legislature, and a parent or their estate can be ordered to pay adult child support even after one or both of the parents die.[91] While an adult child's need for this support must initially be determined without considering their parents' standard of living, the amount of adult child support that a parent is ordered to pay can be based on their standard of living.[92]

In virtually every divorce case, the court divides, usually equally, the parties' community property and community debts.[93] As part of the community estate's division, the court can also order credits and reimbursements that can change the way the estate is divided. These can be ordered for things like the value of a spouse's personal effort spent during the marriage to improve a separate asset for which the community may have been inadequately compensated,[94] or for a portion of the rental value of a community asset that was used by only one of the parties after their separation.[95]

The court can also order reimbursement for a party's separate funds that have been spent on—for example, the acquisition or improvement of either community property or the other spouse's separate property,[96] the payment of community or separate debts after the parties' separation,[97] or that one party to reimburse the other for their share of community funds that have been spent on certain things, such as to obtain an education or training.[98] The court can also order one party to reimburse the other for their share of community funds that have been misappropriated,[99] such as when one party makes an unauthorized gift of community property to someone else.[100]

In *In re Marriage of Leni*, a divorce case that was decided in 2006, the husband used community funds from the proceeds of the sale of a family house to support his ailing mother.[101] The trial court ordered the husband to reimburse the wife the sum of $12,000 for the portion that ordinarily should have been her share.[102] The husband argued that he was obligated to support his ailing mother, so he should not be required to reimburse the community.[103]

The trial court rejected this argument, stating: "You know as well as I do that you're under no obligation to pay for your parent's expenses just as you're under no legal obligation to pay for your child's expenses once they are over the age of eighteen."[104] The husband appealed the trial court's order.[105]

In its opinion, the appellate court noted that the California laws regarding filial support is not commonly known, referencing an earlier law review article, "America's Best Kept Secret: An Adult Child's Duty to Support Aged Parents," that had been published on the subject.[106] The appellate court then corrected the trial court, holding that if the circumstances were such that the husband was obligated to support his ailing mother, that duty would not have been the husband's alone and would have been considered a community obligation.[107]

The appellate court also held that, as a community obligation, the husband's use of community funds to support his ailing mother would not have been an unauthorized gift.[108] Under Family Code §915, when a spouse uses community funds to pay support for a child from another relationship or a spouse from another marriage, if separate funds that could be used instead were available, the courts will order a reimbursement.[109]

The appellate court in *Leni* held that because Family Code §915 does not expressly provide for such a reimbursement for payments for filial support, the husband would not owe a reimbursement under that theory, nor would any other law that was raised before the appellate court have required the husband to reimburse the wife for such a use of community funds.[110] The appellate court then reversed the portion of the order requiring the husband to pay $12,000 as a reimbursement to the wife and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with its holdings.[111]

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[1] Cal. Fam. Code §4400 *et seq.*
[2] Cal. Fam. Code §3900 *et seq.*
[3] Cal. Fam. Code §4300 *et seq.*
[4] *IRMO Leni*, 144 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1097 (2006).
[5] Authors' Note: An additional source of obscurity and confusion regarding filial support may be the way in which many statutes, opinions, and other publications refer to the obligation that a parent can have to support an adult child as "parental support." To the authors of this article, "parental support" seems as though it should instead be another name for the support that can be owed to a parent, just as the support that can be owed to a minor child is called "child support" and the support that can be owed to a spouse is called "spousal support." Regardless, in an effort to achieve the greatest degree of clarity, this article will refer to the obligation that an adult child can have to support a parent as filial support, and the obligation that a parent can have to support an adult child as "adult child support."
[6] Cal. Fam. Code §3910.

[7] *People v. Heitzman*, 9 Cal.4th 189, 212 (1994).
[8] *Jones v. Jones*, 179 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1014 (1986).
[9] *Duffy v. Yordi*, 149 Cal. 140, 142 (1906).
[10] *Id.*
[11] *Heitzman*, 9 Cal.4th 189 at 210, FN 18.
[12] *Radich v. Kruly*, 226 Cal.App.2d 683, 686 (1964).
[13] *Id.*
[14] *Duffy*, 149 Cal. at 142.
[15] *Id.*
[16] *Duffy*, 149 Cal. at 140.
[17] *Duffy*, 149 Cal. at 140-141.
[18] *Duffy*, 149 Cal. at 141-143.
[19] *Duffy*, 149 Cal. at 141.
[20] *Duffy*, 149 Cal. at 142-143.
[21] *Britton v. Steinberg*, 208 Cal.App.2d 358, 359-360 (1962).
[22] *Britton*, 208 Cal.App.2d at 358.
[23] *Britton*, 208 Cal.App.2d at 358-359.
[24] *Id.*
[25] *Britton*, 208 Cal.App.2d at 359.
[26] *Id.*
[27] *Britton*, 208 Cal.App.2d at 359-360.
[28] *Britton*, 208 Cal.App.2d at 360.
[29] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 683.
[30] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 685.
[31] *Id.*
[32] Cal. Fam. Code §4320.
[33] Cal. Fam. Code §4324, 4324.5, 4325.
[34] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 685.
[35] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 685-686.
[36] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 686-687.
[37] *Id.*
[38] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 687.
[39] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 687-689.
[40] *Stark v. County of Alameda*, 182 Cal.App.2d 20 (1960).
[41] *Chryst v. Chryst*, 204 Cal.App.2d 620 (1962).
[42] Cal. Fam. Code §4410 et seq.
[43] *Parshall v. Parshall*, 56 Cal.App. 553 (1922).
[44] *Parshall*, 56 Cal.App. at 553-554.
[45] *Parshall*, 56 Cal.App. at 554-555.
[46] *Parshall*, 56 Cal.App. at 554.
[47] *Parshall*, 56 Cal.App. at 555.
[48] *Parshall*, 56 Cal.App. at 555-556.
[49] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 687-689.
[50] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 685.
[51] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 687-689.
[52] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 687.
[53] *Gluckman v. Gaines*, 266 Cal.App.2d 52 (1968).
[54] *Gluckman*, 266 Cal.App.2d at 57-59.
[55] *Gluckman*, 266 Cal.App.2d at 59.
[56] *Id.*
[57] *Gluckman*, 266 Cal.App.2d at 59-60.
[58] *Id.*
[59] *Gluckman*, 266 Cal.App.2d at 60.
[60] *Id.*
[61] *Heitzman*, 9 Cal.4th 189 at 210, FN 18.
[62] Cal. Fam. Code §4403; See also *Huntoon v. Powell*, 88 Cal.App. 657 (1928); *County of San Mateo v. Boss*, 3 Cal.3d 962 (1971); *Swoap v. Superior Court*, 10 Cal.3d 490 (1973); and *Lara v. Board of Supervisors*, 59 Cal.App.3d 399 (1976).
[63] Cal. Fam. Code §4404.
[64] *Gluckman*, 266 Cal.App.2d at 58.
[65] *Radich*, 226 Cal.App.2d at 685.
[66] *Evans v. Shanklin*, 16 Cal.App.2d 358 (1936).
[67] *Evans*, 16 Cal.App.2d at 362-363.
[68] *Perry v. Medina*, 192 Cal.App.3d 603, 609-611 (1987).
[69] *Id.*
[70] Perry, 192 Cal.App.3d at 609-611.
[71] *Id.*
[72] *Id.*
[73] *Heitzman*, 9 Cal.4th at 189.
[74] *Id.*
[75] *Heitzman*, 9 Cal.4th at 194.
[76] *Heitzman*, 9 Cal.4th at 194-195.
[77] *Id.*
[78] *Id.*
[79] *Id.*
[80] *Heitzman*, 9 Cal.4th at 196.
[81] *Id.*
[82] *Id.*
[83] *Id.*
[84] *Heitzman*, 9 Cal.4th at 196-197.
[85] Cal. Penal Code §270c.
[86] *Heitzman*, 9 Cal.4th at 211-214.
[87] *Heitzman*, 9 Cal.4th 189 at 210, FN 18.
[88] Cal. Fam. Code §3020 et seq.; Cal. Fam. Code §3600.
[89] Cal. Fam. Code §3910.
[90] *Chun v. Chun*, 190 Cal.App.3d 589 (1987).
[91] Cal. Fam. Code §4050 et seq.; *IRMO Drake*, 53 Cal. App.4th 1139 (1997).
[92] *IRMO Cecilia & David W.*, 241 Cal.App.4th 1277 (2015).
[93] Cal. Fam. Code §2550, 2622.
[94] *Van Camp v. Van Camp*, 53 Cal.App. 17 (1921).
[95] *IRMO Watts*, 171 Cal.App.3d 366 (1985).
[96] Cal. Fam. Code §2640.
[97] Cal. Fam. Code §914, 916, 2626.
[98] Cal. Fam. Code §2641.
[99] Cal. Fam. Code §2602.
[100] Cal. Fam. Code §1100(a).
[101] *Leni*, 144 Cal.App.4th at 1091-1099.
[102] *Leni*, 144 Cal.App.4th at 1091.
[103] *Leni*, 144 Cal.App.4th at 1091-1099.
[104] *Leni*, 144 Cal.App.4th at 1097.
[105] *Leni*, 144 Cal.App.4th at 1091.
[106] *Leni*, 144 Cal.App.4th at 1097. See also *America's Best Kept Secret: An Adult Child's Duty to Support Aged Parents*, 26 Cal. Western L.Rev. 351 (1990).
[107] *Leni*, 144 Cal.App.4th at 1097-1098.
[108] *Leni*, 144 Cal.App.4th at 1097-1099.
[109] Cal. Fam. Code §915.
[110] *Id.*
[111] *Leni*, 144 Cal.App.4th at 1199.